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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

Feature
For this issue's Feature,the Reporter presents a Book Review By John
S. Vishneski, 111*, reviewing Environmental Liability Insurance
Law: An Analysis of Toxic Tort and
Hazardous Waste Insurance Coverage Issues. By Kenneth S. Abraham. Prentice Hall Law & Business, 1991. Pp. xiv, 410.

Lifting The Fog From
Environmental Liability
Insurance Coverage
Disputes: A Book
Review
Fog everywhere. Fog up the river, where it flows among the green
aits and meadows; fog down the
river, where it rolls defiled among
the tiers of shipping, and the waterside pollutions of a great (and
dirty) city.... And hard by Temple
Bar, in Lincoln's Inn Hall, at the
very heart of the fog, sits the Lord
High Chancellor in his High Court
of Chancery.

Charles Dickens, BLEAK HOUSE'
I. Introduction
Today, a fog very much like that
described by Charles Dickens in
BLEAK HOUSE has descended upon
the American judiciary. This fog is
generated by intense courtroom
battles fought over the question of
who will pay to clean up the environmental damage caused by industrialization. The issues are so
numerous and complex, the disagreement between the parties so
profound, and the results so diverse, that the only constant to be
found in such cases is the haze of
confusion.
II. Background
These disputes arise primarily
between insurance companies and
the biggest consumers of insurance, the manufacturing industry.
These disputes arise because, under modern environmental statutes, manufacturers can be held

absolutely liable for pollution
caused or threatened by their waste
products. Such liability is imposed
without regard to fault or proximate causation, and it applies retroactively, making companies liable today for their own acts and
acts of third parties that were legal2
at the time they were performed.
Companies facing this unexpected
type of liability have turned to
their liability insurers for coverage.
Insurance companies, however,
claim that their policies do not
cover such liability.
These insurance coverage disputes are pervasive because of the
manner in which modern environmental statutes are enforced. Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
Liability Act, ("CERCLA"), 3 for
example, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") selects for cleanup certain
contaminated sites which it places
onto its National Priorities List
("NPL"). At each site, the EPA
designates as many liable parties as
it can identify (called "Responsible
Parties" under the statute) and
orders those parties to clean the
site. If the Responsible Parties refuse to perform the required remedial actions, each can be held jointly and severally liable for the EPA's
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cost to perform the remediation
itself.4 At many sites there are
more than one hundred Responsible Parties, and currently, there are
1,200 sites on the NPL. 5 Thus,
since each Responsible Party at
each site potentially has an insurance claim, the number of such
claims, and coverage suits, is quite
large.
The amounts involved are also
very large. The EPA estimates that
the 1,200 sites on the NPL will cost
an average of $29 million each to
clean up.6 Also, some companies
are designated as Responsible Parties at numerous sites; thus they
have several coverage suits or large
suits involving many sites. In addition, the EPA predicts that the
total number of sites on the NPL
will rise to 2, 100 by the year 2000,
and estimates of the total costs
associated with the CERCLA legislation range from $150 to $700
billion.7
Hence, the fog develops. Faced
with the prospect of paying for the
enormous costs associated with environmental remediation, insurance companies are challenging environmental liability claims with
extreme fervor. Most environmental liability coverage suits begin
with procedural battles. Because
courts of different states disagree
as to the proper resolution of many
substantive issues, there is often a
scrap over whether the forum in
which the suit was filed is the
correct forum. Once that question
is resolved, the parties fight about
which state's law the forum court
should apply.
Then discovery battles rage.
This happens because, typically,
the parties do not know what the
law will be with respect to substantive coverage defenses until the
court declares it. The parties are
thus forced to attempt to gather
several sets of facts to support their
positions with respect to each of
the several possible interpretations
* Associate, Keck, Mahin & Cate,
Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1985,
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of the law.
When a court finally gets to the
point of deciding how the relevant
insurance policy provisions should
be interpreted, it faces complex
and often novel arguments with
respect to each of numerous defenses to coverage. In one case that
the author is personally involved
with, a policyholder's complaint
against several of its insurers was
answered with a combined total of
one-hundred forty-nine affirmative defenses. The insurers were
attempting to find a defense in just
about every provision of their contracts.

Faced with the prospect of
paying for the enormous
costs associated with
environmental remediation,
insurance companies are
challenging environmental
liability claims with
extreme fervor.
These novel and complex arguments arise because of the large
sums of money at stake. Industry
and insurance companies are fighting these cases hard. As a result,
our judiciary is faced with an everthickening morass of substantive
and procedural legal issues that
pervade environmental liability insurance coverage disputes like a
Dickensian fog.
Ill. Clearing The Fog
Into the midst of this fog, like a
stiff breeze preceding a change in
the weather, comes Professor Kenneth Abraham's new book, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
TOXIC TORT AND HAZARDOUS
WASTE INSURANCE COVERAGE IS-

SUES,' a book which goes a long
way toward clearing the judicial
air.
The first thing one notices about
Environmental Liability Insurance
Law is that its author's perspective
is unique. Much of recent scholarship concerned with environmental insurance coverage is written by
advocates whose efforts are directed primarily at providing support
Volume 4 Number 3/Spring, 1992

for the litigation positions they
take on behalf of their clients. 9 As a
professor of law at the University
of Virginia who teaches and writes
extensively about insurance law,
Professor Abraham has no such
client constraints. Therefore, as an
academic, Abraham provides a
much more evenhanded analysis
than previous authors.

..As an academic,
Abraham provides a much
more evenhanded analysis
than previous authors.
This evenhanded approach to
the subject is an important first
step toward lifting the fog. Environmental Liability Insurance Law
does not attempt to state, authoritatively, what the law is; it is not a
comprehensive collection and
analysis of cases, and it is not a
piece of advocacy. Rather, it is an
attempt to identify the problems of
insurance policy interpretation the
courts currently face and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of
the arguments on either side of the
numerous questions.
IV. Getting To The Heart Of The
Matter

The value of ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW lies in
the extent to which it is successful
in getting to the heart of the complex issues and exposing the illogic
or limitations of the competing
arguments.
The book is most successful in
exposing the limitations of oftenrepeated arguments. For example,
one central issue involves the interpretation of the phrase "as damages" found in the widely-used

The book is most
successful in exposing the
limitations of
often-repeated arguments.
standard-form coverage clause of
commercial liability insurance policies, which are usually at issue in
these cases. The standard-form
policy covers "all sums which the
insured shall become legally obli-

gated to pay as damages because of
bodily injury or property damage
to which this insurance applies
caused by an occurrence."' 0
Insurance companies often argue that CERCLA liability does
not constitute "sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages."'" This
argument is based on the maxim
that every word in a contract
should be given independent
meaning and should not be interpreted such that words or phrases
are superfluous.
The first step in this argument is
to point out that the word "damages" has two possible interpretations, one making the phrase "as
damages" superfluous and the other not. Under a broad interpretation, "damages" can refer to any
costs imposed on a defendant
through litigation whereas under a
narrower interpretation it refers
only to monetary awards, as opposed to injunctive or other nonmonetary relief.
Next, insurers argue that the
broader interpretation should be
rejected because if "damages" is
taken to mean any costs imposed
on a defendant through litigation,
then the phrase "all sums which
the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages" becomes equivalent to "all sums
which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay." Such a
result, insurers claim, reads the
phrase "as damages" out of the
policy. Thus, "damages" must be
interpreted narrowly as including
only monetary awards.
According to insurance companies, CERCLA liability typically
imposes only non-monetary costs
on policyholders because the EPA
usually orders Responsible Parties
to clean up a site rather than
ordering them to pay money to
reimburse someone else for cleaning the site. This form of liability,
insurance companies argue, would
be covered if the term "damages"
were interpreted in its broader
sense, but is not covered if "damages" is interpreted in its narrower
sense.
This issue often becomes very
complex in court battles because
the parties argue, for example,
(continued on page 94)
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about whether the "independent
meaning" rule takes precedence
over other rules of interpretation
that yield different results, or
whether a CERCLA order to clean
a site is equivalent to an order to
reimburse someone else for cleaning the site. Both arguments generate a dense fog.
Abraham ...

cuts right

through the fog to the heart
of the matter...
Abraham, however, cuts right
through the fog to the heart of the
matter by exposing a fatal limitation of the "independent meaning"
argument, stating as follows:
If the only form of legal
obligation that could possibly
be precluded from coverage
by the "as damages" clause
were the obligation to pay
cleanup costs, then the fact
that the clause does contain
words of limitation ["as damages"] would strongly suggest
that liability for such costs
does not constitute liability
payable "as damages." There
are a number of different
kinds of legal obligations,
however, that would fall
within the terms of the Insuring Agreement in the absence
of the "as damages" clause.
On occasion taxes or subdivision exactions may be levied
on a distinct class of citizens
or property owners in order
to raise funds to make repairs
of property that has suffered
damage (a private road in a
subdivision damaged by
flooding, for example). Similarly, civil penalties for violation of statutes or ordinances
are sometimes assessed on a
strict liability basis. Because
insurance against liability for
such penalties probably
would not violate public policy, the "as damages" language functions to preclude12
coverage of such liabilities.
Hence, Abraham concludes, since
the "as damages" phrase functions
to preclude coverage for such taxes
94

and penalties, "as damages" is not
read out of the policy if the phrase
is interpreted in its broader sense
as including any costs imposed on
a defendant through litigation.
Abraham's approach disposes of
the "independent meaning" argument by showing that it does not
really help resolve the "as damages" issue one way or the other.
This analysis makes the usual complex arguments unnecessary. As he
does with the "as damages" issue,
Abraham cuts to the heart of many
of the central issues in these environmental insurance coverage
suits and exposes the weaknesses
and limitations of the arguments
made by both sides. It is this
approach to analyzing environmental insurance coverage issues
and Abraham's success in applying
it that makes

ENVIRONMENTAL LI-

ABILITY INSURANCE LAW

valuable.

Abraham's approach
disposes of the
"independent meaning"
argument by showing that it
does not really help resolve
the "as damages" issue
one way or the other.
V. Scope Of Issues
The value of ENVIRONMENTAL
is enhanced by its comprehensive
LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW

scope. Abraham analyzes issues
relating to the 1966, 1973 and
1986 versions of the standard-form
comprehensive general liability
("CGL") policy. He discusses issues that arise with respect to
"umbrella" or "excess" insurance
(i.e., policies that provide coverage
for losses exceeding the limits of
relevant CGL policies). He analyzes liability policies produced in the
late 1970s and early 1980s which
the insurance industry specifically
designed to cover environmental
losses, called Environmental Impairment Liability and Pollution
Liability Insurance policies,' 3 and
Abraham even discusses the potential coverage for environmental liafirst-party property
bility under
14
insurance.

In addition to these topics, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSUR-

ANCE LAW

addresses procedural

issues such as forum selection and
choice of law questions. The book
also touches briefly on the areas of
reinsurance law (a reinsurance policy provides insurance for insurance companies) and consolidation of large multi-party or
multi-site coverage litigation. In
short,

ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE LAW has something

useful to say about most topics one
is likely to encounter in environmental insurance coverage litigation.

Since the book does not
attempt to discuss every
authority and every
argument on every subject,
it is able to accomplish its
limited purpose with a large
number of topics.
VI. One Caveat
In general, Abraham's approach
to analyzing the issues, getting to
the heart of the matter, fits well
with the comprehensive scope of
issues treated. Since the book does
not attempt to discuss every authority and every argument on
every subject, it is able to accomplish its limited purpose with a
large number of topics.
With respect to some subjects,
however, Abraham's limited approach to analysis leaves much
unsaid. For example, the book's
discussion of the 1970 standardform pollution exclusion clause is
little more than a primer on the
subject. The 1970 pollution exclusion states:
This insurance does not
apply... to bodily injury or
property damage arising out
of the discharge, dispersal,
release or escape of [pollutants] into or upon land, the
atmosphere or any water
course or body of water; but
this exclusion does not apply
if such discharge, dispersal,
release or escape is sudden
and accidental.'
The judicial debate concerning this
exclusion centers on the question
of whether it allows for coverage of
Volume 4 Number 3/Spring, 1992
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all occurrences of unexpected and
unintended discharges of pollutants or only for those unexpected
and unintended discharges of pollutants that also take place in a
short or instantaneous period of
time.
In discussing the 1970 pollution
exclusion clause, Abraham makes
several important points. He notes
that this standard-form language
was centrally drafted by insurance
industry trade organizations and
then promulgated to state insurance commissioners for approval.
Because that process is similar to
the drafting of legislation, the
drafting and approval history of
such insurance policy language is
relevant to its interpretation in the
same way legislative history is relevant to the interpretation of a

statute. 16
Abraham then analyzes the
short standard explanation sent by
the insurance industry to all state
insurance commissioners in 1970
and the representations made by
insurance industry representatives
to the West Virginia Insurance
Commissioner in a July 1970 hearing held concerning the meaning
and effect of the then-proposed
exclusion. From his analysis of this
limited information, Abraham
concludes that the insurance industry represented to state officials
that the pollution exclusion was
meant to allow coverage for unintended and unexpected pollution,
but that no representations were
made concerning the supposed additional requirement that discharges of pollutants take place in a
short or instantaneous period of
7
time.'
As far as it goes, this analysis
appears to be sound. There is,
however, a great deal more to be
said about the drafting and promulgation history of the 1970 pollution exclusion. For example, the
minutes of meetings of the industry trade organization principally
responsible for drafting the exclusion and correspondence among its
members and by it members with
third parties shed light on the real
intentions of those who drafted the
exclusion. These documents tell an
interesting story, but that story has
not been allowed to come to light
because the insurance industry
Volume 4 Number 3/Spring, 1992

zealously protect's these records
from public scrutiny.

There is ... a great deal
more to be said about the
drafting and promulgation
history of the 1970
pollution exclusion.
In addition, whatever the more
complete drafting history reveals,
such information must be interpreted in view of the fact that the
1970 pollution exclusion was drafted long before CERCLA liability
was created in 1980. In 1970, there
was no such thing as retroactive,
absolute, joint and several liability
for the actions of third-party waste
haulers over whom the policyholder had no control. The 1970 pollution exclusion could not possibly
have been consciously intended by
the insurance industry to exclude a
type of liability that did not exist,
yet courts are called upon to decide
whether the language of the exclusion, as a matter of coincidence,
happens to exclude such liability.
These considerations concerning the 1970 pollution exclusion
are necessary for a complete analysis, but are not discussed in ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW. This limitation,

however, does not detract from the
value of Abraham's analysis. If
Abraham attempted to include a
complete discussion in his treatment of each topic, the resulting
book would have been much longer
and would not have accomplished
its purpose of getting to the heart of
the various issues. Nevertheless,
the reader should not expect that
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW is the ending point

of research, rather it is the beginning, and a very good one at that.

ronmental liability insurance.
More experienced lawyers and
judges should use the book to focus
on meritorious positions, and consequently, to begin clearing away
the Dickensian fog currently permeating American courts.
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VII. Conclusion
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY IN-

SURANCE LAW is an

excellent and

evenhanded introduction to the
myriad issues in environmental
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represent insurance companies or
insured consumers, should use the
book to become familiar with the
numerous complex issues of envi95

